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Wills, Trusts, Guardianships, and
Fiduciary Administration
by Mary F. Radford*
This Article describes selected cases and significant legislation from
the period of June 1, 2011 through May 31, 2012 that pertain to Georgia
fiduciary law and estate planning.'
I.

GEORGIA CASES

Constructionof the Terms of a Will
The case of Stewart v. Ray 2 involved the interpretation of the
commonly-used term "per stirpes" in the will of Willy Ray, Sr., who was
survived by his eight children? One of Ray's daughters, Stewart, served
as his conservator during life4 and was named as the executor under his

A.

* Marjorie Fine Knowles Professor of Law, Georgia State University College of Law.
Newcomb College of Tulane University (B-A., 1974); Emory University (J.D., 1981).
Reporter, Probate Code Revision Committee, Guardianship Code Revision Committee,
Trust Code Revision Committee of the Fiduciary Section of the State Bar of Georgia.
Immediate Past President, American College of Trust and Estate Counsel. Author, MARY
F. RADFORD, REDFEARN: WILLS AND ADMINISTRATION IN GEORGIA (7th ed. 2008); MARY F.
RADFORD, GEORGIA GuARDIANsHIPS AND CONSERVATORSHIPS (2012 ed.); MARY F. RADFORD,
GEORGIA TRUSTS & TRUSTEES (2012-2013 ed.).
1. For an analysis of Georgia fiduciary law and estate planning during the prior survey
period, see Mary F. Radford, Wills, Trusts,Guardianships,and FiduciaryAdministration,
Annual Survey of Georgia Law, 63 MERCER L. REV. 385 (2011).
2. 289 Ga. 679, 715 S.E.2d 79 (2011).
3. Id. at 679-80, 715 S.E.2d at 79.
4. Ray had been injured in an accident earlier in his life. His daughter, Stewart, had
served as his conservator while he was alive. After he died, she was discharged as
conservator. Id. at 679, 715 S.E.2d at 79. Stewart's sister made an unsuccessful challenge
to the discharge on due process grounds. See Ray v. Stewart, 287 Ga. 789, 789, 700 S.E.2d
367, 368 (2010).
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will.5 One of Ray's other daughters asked for a declaratory judgment
interpreting the following Item IV of Ray's will:
All the rest, residue and remainder of my property, I give, devise and
bequeath to my eight (8) children, per stirpes, at the discretion of my
Executor, to be divided among them as and in the manner in which my
Executor in his or her sole discretion determines to be fair and
reasonable. If any of my children do not survive me, his or her share
of my property shall pass to his or her lineal descendants, if any, per
stirpes. If a child predeceases me without leaving lineal descendants,
his or her share shall pass to my surviving children.'
The Fulton County Probate Court determined this language indicated
that the testator intended his children to share equally in his estate.'
Stewart had interpreted the language as giving her sole discretion over
how and to whom to distribute the property, including the discretion to
distribute the estate to herself alone and thus exclude her sibilings. s
The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the probate court's interpretation
of the language of the will.9 The term "per stirpes" is used in the
Georgia Probate Code to describe how property is to pass under the rules
of intestacy" in the event that the primary taker has died before the
decedent. A distribution "per stirpes" is a distribution that divides the
property among the "stocks" or "roots" of the decedent's family." So,
for example, if a decedent dies and is survived by one daughter and by
two grandchildren who are the children of a son who died before the
decedent the daughter represents one "root" and takes one-half of the
estate and the children of the deceased son (the other "root") share that

5. Stewart, 289 Ga. at 679, 715 S.E.2d at 79. The "executor" is the "person nominated
in a will who has qualified to administer a testate estate." O.C.G.A. § 53-1-2(7) (2011).
6. Stewart, 289 Ga. at 680, 715 S.E.2d at 80. The other daughter also asked the court
to construe Item I of Ray's will which contained similar language dividing his personal
property among his eight children per stirpes. Id. at 679, 715 S.E.2d at 79.
7. Id. at 680, 715 S-E.2d at 80.
8. Id. at 681, 715 S.E.2d at 80.
9. Id. at 682, 715 S.E.2d at 81. Stewart contended that the use of the term "per
stirpes" was meant only to ensure that, if she determined that one of Ray's children were
to receive a distribution and that child was dead, that child's distribution would be made
to the descendants of that child. Id. at 681, 715 S.E.2d at 80.
10. An individual who dies "intestate" is an individual who dies without a valid will.
O.C.GA § 53-2-1(c) describes the individuals to whom property will be distributed (the
"heirs" of that individual) if the decedent has no will. O.C.GA § 53-2-1(c) (2011).
11. The term "per stirpes" means by the "root" or "stock." MacGregor v. Roux, 198 Ga.
520, 522, 32 S.E.2d 289, 290 (1944); see also 3 BOUVIER'S LAW DICTIONARY 3138 (8th ed.
1914).
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son's one-half interest.' When the term "per stirpes" is used in a will,
it is presumed that the term directs the property to be distributed
"where the law carries it"" (in other words, in the same manner as the
term is used for intestate distribution), although the court may find that
the testator intended a different meaning when he or she used the term
in the will. 14 The court in Stewart emphasized that the testator's
intent will prevail in the construction of the will and that the court
should look to the "four corners" of the will to find that intent. 15 The
court also noted that, in addition to the term "per stirpes," Ray used the
term "share" throughout the will, indicating that he did not intend to
allow the executor to distribute the entire estate to herself, thus
depriving the other children of a "share."16 The supreme court also
looked to its past ruling in a 1980 case that contained a devise to "my
nieces and nephews, per stirpes."17 In that case, the court had determined that the term "per stirpes" indicated a desire that all of the nieces
and nephews would be "the stirps" and thus the 'primary legatees.""
The court concluded that each of Ray's children were meant to take an
equal share of his estate.' 9 The court said that to grant the executor
unbridled discretion to distribute the estate in any other manner would
20
leave the terms "share" and "per stirpes" without meaning.

12. Under O.C.G.A. § 53-2-1(c)(3), the property of a decedent who has no spouse is to
be divided equally among the decedent's children. O.C.G.A. § 53-2-1(cX3). However, if any
child dies before the decedent, that child's share is to be distributed to that child's
descendants "per stirpes." id. For a discussion of inheritance per stirpes, see MARY F.
RADFORD, REDFEARN: WILLS AND ADMINISTRATION IN GEORGIA § 9:2 (7th ed. 2008).
13. In re Will of Lewis, 263 Ga. 349, 351, 434 S.E.2d 472, 473 (1993).
14. See Fleming v. First Union Nat'l Bank, 274 Ga. 527, 528, 555 S.E.2d 728, 730
(2001); Bennett v. Lloyd, 245 Ga. 706, 706, 267 S.E.2d 3, 3-4 (1980).
15. Stewart, 289 Ga. at 680, 715 S.E.2d at 80 (quoting Hood v. Todd, 287 Ga. 164, 166,
695 S.E.2d 31, 32 (2010)).
16. Id. at 681, 715 S.E.2d at 81.
17. Id. at 681, 715 S.E.2d at 80 (quoting Bennett, 245 Ga. at 706, 267 S.E.2d at 3).
18. Bennett, 245 Ga. at 706, 267 S.E.2d at 4. In Bennett, the testator was survived by
eleven nieces and nephews. One niece was the child of a living brother, one was the child
of a deceased brother, four were the children of a living brother, and five were the children
of another living brother. The executors insisted that the term "per stirpes" required a
division at the level of their parents, who were the testator's four brothers, with the child
or children of each brother to share that brother's one-fourth share. Id. at 706, 267 S.E.2d
at 3. The court determined that since the testator had referred specifically to her nieces
and nephews, she intended that the distribution be made equally among them. Id at 706,
267 S.E.2d at 3-4.
19. Stewart, 289 Ga. at 681, 715 S.E.2d at 80.
20. Id. at 681, 715 S.E.2d at 81.
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B.

DiscretionaryPower of a Trustee
In Reliance Trust Co. v. Candler,21 the Georgia Court of Appeals
affirmed a jury verdict of over $1 million against a trustee and in favor
of the remainder beneficiaries. 2 The trust was a revocable marital
trust set up by Claire Candler in the year before she died. The trust
gave the income to Claire's husband, Buddy, for life and provided that
the remainder would be distributed among their children and grandchildren as appointed by Buddy in his will.23 The trust also included the
following provision:
Whenever in the sole judgment of the [t]rustee the income being paid
to [Buddy], together with any other income or periodic payments
known to the [t]rustee that are being received by [Buddy] shall be
insufficient for his proper support, maintenance, or to enable him to
meet any difficulty produced by sickness, accident, or similar cause,
such portion of the corpus of this trust estate as in the discretion of the
[tirustee is deemed appropriate shall be paid to him or for his
benefit.'
The trust was funded when Claire died, and Buddy then became the cotrustee, along with another individual. A few years later, Wachovia
Bank replaced that individual as co-trustee and, in 2001, Reliance Trust
Co. replaced Wachovia. The trust contained $2.1 million in assets when
Reliance became co-trustee. While Reliance was acting as co-trustee, the
trust distributed over $1 million from the principal of the trust to Buddy.
When Buddy died, the remainder beneficiaries received $838,762 from
the trust. They brought suit against Reliance for the total amount of the
distributions made to Buddy (plus interest from the time each distribution was made), and the jury rendered a verdict in their favor.2 5 The
court of appeals affirmed. 26 The court of appeals prefaced its discussion
by listing the three elements of a breach of fiduciary duty claim: (1) the

21. 315 Ga. App. 495, 726 S.E.2d 636 (2012). This case is discussed in MARY F.
RADFORD, GEORGIA TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 4:2 (2012-2013 ed.).

22. Reliance Trust Co., 315 Ga. App. at 504-05, 726 S.E.2d at 644.
23. Id. at 495-96, 726 S.E.2d at 638. Buddy exercised this power of appointment to
appoint the remainder to his grandchildren. After he died, they filed suit against Reliance
Trust Co. Id.

24. Id. at 497, 726 S.E.2d at 639 (alteration in original).
25. Id. at 496-97, 726 S.E.2d at 638-39.
26. Id. at 497, 726 S.E.2d at 639. The court of appeals first affirmed the trial court's
denial of Reliance's motion for summary judgment, stating that the question was moot
because the case had proceeded to trial and there was evidence that supported the verdict.

Id.
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existence of the duty; (2) a breach of the duty; and (3) damages
proximately caused by that breach.2 7 The court determined that all
three elements had been satisfied.28 The court noted the trustee's duty
to balance the interests of the income and remainder beneficiaries.29
The court then addressed whether the trustee had abused the discretion
granted it by the trust instrument, pointing out that a trustee's
discretion is subject to judicial control only if such control is needed to
prevent misinterpretation or an abuse of that discretion.3 ° The court
of appeals quoted former case law (and said that the 2010 Revised
Georgia Trust Code was in agreement)3' for the following proposition:
"[A] court may interfere with an exercise of discretion by a trustee only
if that discretion is 'infected with fraud or bad faith, misbehavior, or
misconduct, arbitrariness, abuse of authority or perversion of the trust,
oppression of the beneficiary, or want of ordinary skill or judgment."'
The court held that the trustee's actions were "'infected with ...
arbitrariness,' as well as 'oppression of the beneficiary' grandchildren."33 The court pointed to evidence that Reliance had treated
Buddy's encroachment requests inconsistently, sometimes asking for

27. Id. at 498-99, 726 S.E.2d at 640 (quoting SunTrust Bank v. Merritt, 272 Ga. App.
485, 489, 612 S.E.2d 818, 822 (2005)).
28. Id. at 501, 726 S.E.2d at 641.
29. Id. at 499, 726 S.E.2d at 640 (quoting SunTrust Bank, 272 Ga. App. at 489, 612
S.E.2d at 822).
30. Id. The court cited McPherson v. McPherson, 307 Ga. App. 548, 551, 705 S.E.2d
314, 318 (2011), and noted that the opinion in McPherson cited the RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
oF TRUSTS § 50 (2003). Reliance Trust Co., 315 Ga. App. at 499, 726 S.E.2d at 641.
31. Reliance Trust Co., 315 Ga. App. at 499, 726 S.E.2d at 641. The court cited
O.C.G.A. § 53-12-260, which provides the following: "Notwithstanding the breadth of
discretion granted to a trustee in the trust instrument, including the use of such terms as
'absolute,' 'sole,' or 'uncontrolled,' the trustee shall exercise a discretionary power in
good faith." O.C.G.A. § 53-12-260 (2011). Reliance had claimed that this statute limited
the circumstances under which a trustee can be found to have abused discretion to
circumstances where the trustee acted in bad faith. Reliance Trust Co., 315 Ga. App. at
500 n.3, 726 S.E.2d at 641 n.3. The court disagreed, stating that other factors such as
arbitrariness or fraud could also lead a court to find an abuse of discretion. Id.
32. Reliance Trust Co., 315 Ga. App. at 499-500, 726 S.E.2d at 641 (quoting McPherson,
307 Ga. App. at 552, 705 S.E.2d at 318). The court cited McPherson as the source of this
proposition. Id. In fact, the court in McPhersoncited an earlier Georgia case, Citizens &
Southern National Bank v. Haskins, 254 Ga. 131, 142, 327 S.E.2d 192, 203 (1985), which
was quoting an even earlier case, Citizens & Southern National Bank v. Orkin, 223 Ga.
385, 388, 156 S.E.2d 86, 88 (1967). The court in Orkin cited an early version of the legal
encyclopedia, AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE, 54 AM. JUR. 2D, Control of Trustee's Discretion
§ 287 (1945).
33. Reliance Trust Co., 315 Ga. App. at 500, 726 S.E.2d at 641 (quoting McPherson,307
Ga. App. at 552, 705 S.E.2d at 318).
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Reliance
documentation to support the request, sometimes not.'
sometimes asked for a budget from him and sometimes did not, and even
granted requests that were outside of the submitted budget.-a Reliance
sometimes approved mortgage and upkeep payments on Buddy's
vacation property, and at other times it did not.3 6 The court said that
"Reliance offered no consistent explanations for these disparities."3 7
The court concluded that the grandchildren showed they had been
damaged by the encroachments that had depleted the value of their
remainder interest."8 The court of appeals also found no merit to
Reliance's contention that the trial court should have allowed evidence
about previous litigation involving Buddy and his competence to serve
as trustee of other trusts, nor did it discern error in the trial court's
statement to the jury that they were not bound to define "income" in the
way it is defined in the Official Code of Georgia Annotated (O.C.G.A.)
but should instead look to the intent of the settlor.'9 Reliance filed a
petition for writ of certiorari with the Georgia Supreme Court on May
1, 2012, but as of the date of the writing of this Article, no action has
been taken on the petition.40
C.

Property of the Decedent's Estate

1. Contents of Decedent's Safety Deposit Box. In Longstreet v.
Decker,4 ' the court of appeals examined the issue of the ownership of
the contents of a safety deposit box that had been leased jointly by the
testator and another individual. In this case, the testator and her niece
entered into a lease agreement to lease a safety deposit box. The
agreement allowed either of them access to the box and instructed the
bank to provide access to the other in the event of the death of one of
them. The testator put cash in the safety deposit box before she died.4 2

34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 500-01, 726 S.E.2d at 641.
39. Id. at 501-02, 726 S.E.2d at 642.
40. Reliance Trust Co. v. Candler,315 Ga. App. 495, 726 S.E.2d 636 (2012), petition for
cert. filed (Ga. May 1, 2012) (No. S12C1390).
41. 312 Ga. App. 1, 717 S.E.2d 513 (2011).
42. Id. at 1-2, 717 S.E.2d at 515. The lease named them as joint tenants of the box.
Id. The lease provided as follows:
It is agreed that any one of us alone shall be entitled to access to said box and
control over its contents and shall have the right to surrender said box and cancel
this contract on behalf of all ....
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She told her niece to hold on to the key and "'if anything ever happened
to her, [the niece] should remove the contents of the safe deposit
The niece interpreted this to mean that she would own
box."
whatever was in the box upon her aunt's death. At the testator's death,
the niece removed undisclosed sums of cash from the box and refused to
give it to the executor of the testator's estate. The estate sued her for
conversion and money had and received. The niece asked for and was
denied summary judgment based on the terms of the lease contract,
which allowed her access to the box both during the testator's life and
at the testator's death. The estate was granted its motion for partial
summary judgment on the ground that the contract did not indicate that
the niece owned the contents of the box, and there was no evidence that
the testator had made an inter vivos gift of the contents of the box to the
niece. 44
On the issue of the lease agreement, the niece claimed the terms of the
contract unambiguously gave her "survivorship rights" to the contents
of the box. 45 The trial court pointed out that the contract governed the
rental of the box but not the ownership of the contents. 6 The court of
appeals agreed that the language of the contract referred only to control
of the box, not to ownership of the contents. 47 The court noted the
leasing of a safe deposit box is not the same as the opening of a joint
bank account." O.C.G.A. § 7-1-81341 provides that sums remaining
in account upon the death of a party to a joint account belong to the
other party absent clear and convincing evidence of a different intent at
the time the account was opened."
The court of appeals agreed with the trial court's grant of summary
judgment to the estate on the theory that there was no evidence that an
inter vivos gift had been made to the niece by the testator.5 1 The court
of appeals reviewed the elements of an inter vivos gift, quoting O.C.G.A.

In the event of the death of any of us, the Bank... shall afford access to such box
to the survivor or survivors of us, or any one of them.
Id. at 1, 717 S.E.2d at 515.
43. Id. at 2, 717 S.E.2d at 515.
44. Id. at 2, 717 S.E.2d at 515-16. The court reserved for trial the issue of damages as
there were material issues of fact relating to how much money the niece had removed from
the safety deposit box. Id. at 2-3, 717 S.E.2d at 516.
45. Id. at 2, 717 S.E.2d at 515.
46. Id. at 2, 717 S.E.2d at 516.
47. Id. at 4, 717 S.E.2d at 516.
48. Id. at 5, 717 S.E.2d at 517.
49. O.C.G.A. § 7-1-813(a) (2004).
50. Id.
51. Longstreet, 312 Ga. App. at 5, 717 S.E.2d at 517.
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§ 44-5-80,52 which provides the following: "(1) the donor must intend to
give the gift; (2) the donee must accept the gift; and (3) the gift must be
delivered or some act which under law is accepted as a substitute for
delivery must be done."53 The court emphasized that delivery must be
made during the donor's lifetime and must divest the donor absolutely
of control of the property.14 The court pointed out that the testator had
retained control of the box during her lifetime and could reclaim the
property in the box at any time, and thus there had been no delivery of
the contents of the box to the niece."
2. Ownership of Decedent's Condominium.

The property at

issue in Villas at Stone Mountain Condominium Ass'n v. Blair56 was a

condominium owned by a decedent who had died without a will
(intestate).57 Pauline Blair's mother died intestate, owning a condominium in the Villas at Stone Mountain. Blair never lived in the condominium before or after her mother's death, never claimed ownership of the
condominium, and never gained any financial benefit from it. The
condominium was sold in a foreclosure sale a couple of years after her
mother died.58 The condominium association sued Blair and her sister,
the intestate heirs of the mother,59 for past due fees and assessments
incurred between the date of the mother's death and the foreclosure sale.
The trial court granted summary judgment in Blair's favor.60 The court
of appeals reversed, holding that "the unambiguous language of
Georgia's Probate Code and Condominium Act, when read together,
entitles the association to the relief it claims."61 The court of appeals
cited O.C.G.A. § 53-2-7(a), 6 which provides: "Upon the death of an

52. O.C.G.A. § 44-5-80 (2010).
53. Longstreet, 312 Ga. App. at 5, 717 S.E.2d at 518; see also O.C.GA § 44-5-80.
54. Longstreet, 312 Ga. App. at 5, 717 S.E.2d at 518.
55. Id. at 6-7, 717 S.E.2d at 518-19.
56. 311 Ga. App. 718, 716 S.E.2d 718 (2011).
57. When an individual dies without a valid will (intestate), O.C.G.A. § 53-2-1 directs
the descent of the property to the decedent's family members in accordance with the
scheme set forth in the statute. O.C.G.A. § 53-2-1 (2011).
58. Villas, 311 Ga. App. at 718, 716 S.E.2d at 719.
59. O.C.GA § 53-2-1(c)(3) provides that, upon the death of a decedent who is survived
by children, the surviving children shall share the estate equally. O.C.GA. § 53-2-1(c)(3).
If a child does not survive, his share shall pass down to his descendants. Id. Apparently
in this case, Blair and her sister were the only surviving children of the mother and there
had not been another child who had predeceased the mother and left surviving
descendants. See Villas, 311 Ga. App. at 719, 716 S.E.2d at 719.
60. Villas, 311 Ga. App. at 719, 716 S.E.2d at 719.
61. Id. at 718, 716 S.E.2d at 719.
62. O.C.G.A. § 53-2-7(a) (2011).
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intestate decedent who is the owner of any interest in real property, the
title to any such interest which survives the intestate decedent shall vest
immediately in the decedent's heirs at law, subject to divestment by the
appointment of an administrator of the estate."6' Thus, as the court
noted, title to the condominium vested in the sisters as their mother's
heirs immediately upon her death." Because no administrator had
been appointed, the title remained vested in them until the foreclosure
sale.65
The Georgia Condominium Act, O.C.G.A. § 44-3-109,66 provides that
all unpaid fees and assessments shall be "the personal obligation of the
unit owner." 7 O.C.G.A. § 44-3-71(29)6s defines the "[u]nit owner" as
"one or more persons ... who own a condominium. " s The court of
appeals in Villas concluded that the Georgia Probate Code clearly made
Blair and her sister the "unit owners" immediately upon their mother's
death.7" Blair argued that a creditor cannot seek recovery against an
intestate heir for the decedent's personal debt, but the court of appeals
pointed out that the association was not seeking recovery for the
mother's debts but rather for the assessments incurred after the
mother's death up to the time of the foreclosure. 7'
D.

Guardianshipand Conservatorship

In the case of In re Cochran,72 the Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed
the appointment of a conservator for a woman who had fallen victim to
a number of false claims that she had won huge sums of money in bogus
lotteries and sweepstakes.7 3 A conservator may be appointed for an
adult when the probate court finds that the adult "lacks sufficient
capacity to make or communicate significant responsible decisions
concerning the management of his or her property."74

63. Villas, 311 Ga. App. at 719, 716 S.E.2d at 719; see also O.C.G.A. § 53-2-7(a). In
contrast, when a decedent dies with a will, title to the property of the estate vests in the
executor and does not pass to the beneficiaries until the executor assents to the
distribution to them. O.C.G. § 53-8-15 (2011).
64. Villas, 311 Ga. App. at 720, 716 S.E.2d at 720.
65. Id.
66. O.C.G.A. § 44-3-109 (2010).
67. O.C.G.A. § 44-3-109(a).
68. O.C.G.A. § 44-3-71(29) (2010).
69. Id.
70. Villas, 311 Ga. App. at 720, 716 S.E.2d at 720.
71. Id.
72. 314 Ga. App. 188, 723 S.E.2d 490 (2012).
73. Id. at 188, 723 S.E.2d at 491.
74. O.C.G.A. § 29-5-1(a) (2007).
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In 2007, Cochran's family became concerned that Cochran was being
financially exploited. They contacted the Georgia Department of Human
Services whose subsequent investigation revealed that she had spent75
$100,000 or more on domestic and foreign lotteries and sweepstakes.
This prompted the family to petition to have an emergency conservator
appointed for her. 6 An emergency conservator may be appointed on an
expedited basis when the probate court finds that there is "an immediate
and substantial risk of irreparable waste or dissipation of the proposed
ward's property unless an emergency conservator is appointed."77 An
emergency conservatorship can stay in place for no more than sixty days
from the date the emergency conservator is appointed.78
Cochran's emergency conservator found that Cochran and her husband
had been fraudulently induced on multiple occasions to spend their
assets on sweepstakes and lotteries. The emergency conservator advised
that, at this rate, the couple would deplete their assets within two years.
As soon as the emergency conservatorship terminated, the couple went
to their bank to withdraw $52,000. The couple brought with them what
they stated was a handwritten note from the president of SunTrust
Bank that advised Cochran that she had won a huge sum in a lottery
but would be required to wire the money to cover her taxes before her
winnings could be distributed to her. The banker (who refused to
authorize the withdrawal) testified that he had to talk the Cochrans out
of withdrawing money several times when they thought they had won
lotteries. 79 He stated that they once had tried to deposit multi-million
dollar checks made payable to Cochran from the "Sweet Steaks Company
of Australia." 0 After another bank (which had authorized the $52,000
withdrawal) reported the suspected financial exploitation to the
Department of Human Services, the Department again conducted an
investigation. The case manager persuaded the Cochrans to consult a
psychologist. 8 '
The psychologist concluded that Cochran met the criterion of the
conservatorship statute because she lacked sufficient capacity to make
responsible decisions about the management of her property. The
Department of Human Services filed a petition for the appointment of

75. In the conservatorship hearing, Ms. Cochran herself testified that she had spent
between $600,000 and $700,000 on these lotteries. In re Cochran, 314 Ga. App. at 188 n.1,
723 S.E.2d at 491 n.1.
76. Id. at 188, 723 S.E.2d at 491.
77. O.C.G.A. § 29-5-14(b)(4) (2007).
78. O.C.GA § 29-5-16(b)(3XE) (2007).
79. In re Cochran, 314 Ga. App. at 188-89, 723 S.E.2d at 491-92.
80. Id. at 189, 723 S.E.2d at 492.
81. Id.
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a conservator for Cochran.8 2 Cochran underwent a court-ordered
evaluation by a licensed elinical social worker, who agreed with the
psychologist as to Cochran's lack of capacity83 After a hearing, the
probate court appointed a conservator for Cochran.' 4 Cochran appealed
the appointment, stating there was not clear and convincing evidence
that she was in need of a conservator to manage her financial affairs.m
The court of appeals affirmed the appointment.'
It agreed with
Cochran's assertion that just because an individual spends large
amounts of money on lotteries does not prove that the individual is in
need of a conservator.17 In fact, the court noted that there may be
people who know the lotteries are a scam but "nevertheless might choose
However, in
to play the lotteries as escapist fantasy and fm. "8'
Cochran's case, it was not the decisions themselves that were the issue
but rather the fact that Cochran's "cognitive loss" impaired her ability
to weigh the consequences of those decisions.8 9

82. Id. The petition included an affidavit from the psychologist. Id. O.C.G.A. § 29-510(cXl) requires that a petition for the appointment of a conservator for an adult must
either be sworn to by two petitioners or supported by such an affidavit. O.C.G-. § 29-510(cX1) (2007). The Department also filed a petition for the appointment of an emergency
conservator for Ms. Cochran as a protective interim measure. This petition was granted.
In re Cochran, 314 Ga. App. at 189 n.2, 723 S.E.2d at 492 n.2. The Department filed a
petition for the appointment of a conservator for Mr. Cochran also but that petition was
dismissed by the court. Id. at 189 n.3, 723 S.E.2d at 492 n.3.
83. In re Cochran, 314 Ga. App. at 189, 723 S.E.2d at 492. O.C.G.A. § 29-5-11(d)
requires an evaluation of a person for whom a conservatorship is sought. O.C.G-A § 29-511(d) (2007). The evaluation may be performed by a physician, a psychologist, or a licensed
clinical social worker. O.C.G.A. § 29-5-11(dXl).
84. In re Cochran, 314 Ga. App. at 189, 723 S.E.2d at 492.
85. Id. at 189-90, 723 S.E.2d at 492. The standard of proof for establishing the need
for a conservatorship is clear and convincing evidence. O.C.GA. § 29-5-12(d)(4) (2007).
The proceeding in question was brought in the Probate Court of Cobb County, which is one
of the probate courts with expanded jurisdiction from which appeals may be taken directly
to the Georgia Court of Appeals or Georgia Supreme Court. See discussion infra at part
II.B.
86. In re Cochran, 314 Ga. App. at 188, 723 S.E.2d at 491.
87. Id. at 190, 723 S.E.2d at 492-93.
88. ld. at 190, 723 S.E.2d at 493. The court quoted this Author's 2005 treatise on
Georgia guardianships and conservatorships, in which she noted that " [w hile itis tempting
to gauge whether a decision is 'responsible' through the lens of one's own value structure,
it is vital that those involved in adult conservatorships isolate the actual decision-making
process from the decision made." Id. at 190 n.4, 723 S.E.2d at 493 n.4 (alteration in
original); see also MARY F. RADFORD, GUARDIANSHPS AND CONSERVATORSHIPS INGEORGIA
§ 5-1, at 239 (1st ed. 2005).
89. In re Cochran, 314 Ga. App. at 190, 723 S.E.2d at 493. The psychologist who had
examined Ms. Cochran prior to the filing of the petition for conservatorship had noted this
"cognitive loss" and the licensed clinical social worker had agreed with his conclusion. Id.
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The psychologist who examined Cochran reported that Cochran was
unable to articulate facts that would support her belief that she had won
the lottery.9" The licensed clinical social worker expressed concern
about Cochran's inability to remember significant details about the
transaction, such as the ability to name the persons who had told
Cochran that she had won $57 million in the lottery.91 The court of
92
appeals also pointed to Cochran's own testimony at the hearing.
Although she "arguably displayed a sound grasp of her financial affairs,"
Cochran told the court that as soon as the hearing was finished, she was
going to meet a man from Jamaica who was bringing her $57 million in
lottery winnings and two cars.93 The court of appeals concluded that
Cochran was a "serial victim of fraudulent lottery schemes" and that her
repeated victimization was caused by her cognitive loss.94
Cochran also raised two other claims on appeal. She claimed first that
the probate court had erred when it denied her motion to have the
petition for the appointment of a conservator dismissed for lack of
probable cause.9 5 O.C.G.A. § 29-5-1116 requires the court to review a
petition and affidavit immediately upon filing in order to determine
whether probable cause exists to believe that the proposed ward is in
need of a conservator. 97 If no probable cause exists, the court must
dismiss the petition.9" The court of appeals stated that a decision by
the probate court not to dismiss the petition is not appealable if the case
has proceeded to trial and a conservatorship has been ordered. 99
Second, Cochran argued that the affidavit of the psychologist should
have been stricken. She challenged the affidavit on several grounds.
Cochran stated that the affidavit was conclusory and did not state facts
to support the psychologist's conclusion that Cochran was in need of a
conservator. 100 The court reviewed the affidavit and found it to be
sufficient.'0 ' The court noted that the affidavit spoke of Cochran's
cognitive loss, her inability to articulate facts to support her belief that

at 190-91, 723 S.E.2d at 493 (internal quotation marks omitted).
90. Id. at 191, 723 S.E.2d at 493.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 190-91, 723 S.E.2d at 493.
95. Id. at 191, 723 S.E.2d at 493-94.
96. O.C.G.A. § 29-5-11 (2007).
97. O.C.G.A. § 29-5-11(a).
98. O.C.G.A. § 29-5-11(b).
99. In re Cochran, 314 Ga. App. at 191-92, 723 S.E.2d at 494.
100. Id. at 192, 723 S.E.2d at 494.
101. Id.
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she had won the lotteries, and her inability to process cause and effect
when presented with specific examples." °u Cochran also argued that
in obtaining the evaluation the state had violated her right to privacy
and her right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures." 3
The court disagreed, noting that Cochran had given permission for the
evaluation and that the psychologist had informed her that it might be
used to support a petition for the appointment of a conservator for
her.104
II.

GEORGIA LEGISLATION

A.

CriminalRecords Check for Guardiansand Conservators
In 2012, the Georgia General Assembly enacted O.C.G.A. § 29-919,05 which allows the probate court to order an individual who is
seeking to be appointed or has been nominated as a guardian 6 or
conservator 10 7 to submit to a criminal history records check." 8

For

purposes of this statute, "criminal history record information" is
"information collected by criminal justice agencies on individuals
consisting of identifiable descriptions and notations of arrests, detentions, indictments, accusations, information, or other formal charges, and
any disposition arising therefrom, sentencing, correctional supervision,
and release." 10 9 To accomplish this records search, the individual who
is seeking appointment, or who has been nominated, submits fingerprints to the Georgia Crime Information Center (GCIC), which searches
its own records and also submits the fingerprints to the Federal Bureau
of Investigation (FBI)." ° The GCIC compiles the information and

102. Id.
103. Id. at 193, 723 S.E.2d at 494.
104. Id. at 193, 723 S.E.2d at 494-95. The case manager for the Department of Human

Services had suggested that Cochran be examined by her own physician but Cochran
refused to do so because she was embarrassed by her actions. Id. at 193, 723 S.E.2d at
494.
105. O.C.G.A. § 29-9-19 (Supp. 2012).
106. A guardian is appointed under O.C.G.A. Title 29, Ch.2 or Ch. 4 to manage the

personal affairs of a minor or an adult who lacks the capacity to do so. See MARY F.
RADFORD, GEORGIA GUARDIANSHIPS AND CONSERVATORSHIPS § 1:5 (2012-2013 ed.).

107. A conservator is appointed under O.C.GA Title 29, Ch. 3 or Ch.5 to handle the
financial affairs of a minor or an adult who lacks the capacity to do so. See MARY F.
RADFORD, GEORGIA GUARDIANSHIPS AND CONSERVATORSHIPS § 1:5 (2012-2013 ed.).
108. O.C.G.A. § 29-9-19(b).
109. O.C.G.A. § 29-9-19(a).
110. O.C.G.A. § 29-9-19(b).
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A limited criminal records

check for personal representatives," 2 as well as for guardians and
conservators, has been authorized since 1999 by Georgia Uniform
Probate Court Rule 24.1.1" This rule allows the court itself to access
the GCIC information with the consent of the individual who is being
investigated. 4 The GCIC Council promulgates detailed practice and
procedure rules for the use of the GCIC. These include, among other
things, rules that would require the probate court to provide "secure
areas out of public view in which criminal justice information is
handled."" 5 A GCIC check performed under this rule would be limited
to the information available in Georgia on the individual, whereas a
search under the new law would extend to information in the hands of
the FBI." 6
B.

GeorgiaProbate Courts with Expanded Jurisdiction

O.C.G.A. §§ 15-9-120 through 15-9-127,11' which were enacted in
1986, allow certain probate courts enhanced jurisdiction to conduct jury
trials"S and perform other acts, and give these courts concurrent
jurisdiction with the superior courts over matters such as declaratory
judgments regarding fiduciaries, appointment of replacement trustees,
and approval of settlement agreements."' Appeals from these courts
go directly to the supreme court or the court of appeals rather than to
the superior court. 120 This enhanced jurisdiction is available only if
the probate judge in the county is a lawyer who has at least seven years
of practice experience and the population of the county is at least 90,000
under the 2010 census or "any future such census."' 2' The population
threshold in the original statute was 150,000.122 It was reduced to

111. Id.

112. A personal representative is "any administrator, administrator with the will
annexed, county administrator, or executor" who handles that estate of a deceased
individual. O.C.G-A. § 53-1-2(12) (2011).
113. GA. UNIFORM PROB. Or. R. 24.1, available at www.georgiacourts.orgcouncils/
probatelURPC.html#124a.
114. Id.
115. GA. CRIME INTo. CTR. COUNcIL R. 140-2-.08 (2007), available at gbi.georgia.

gov/vgn/inages/portal/cit_1210/388/88224162GCIC%2ORules%202007%20Finahpdf.
116. See id. at R. 140-1.01.
117. O.C.G. §§ 15-9-120 to -127 (2012).
118. O.C.GA. § 15-9-121 (2012).
119. O.C.GA § 15-9-127 (2012). For a discussion of the expanded jurisdiction of these
probate courts, see RADFORD, supra note 12, § 6:1.
120. O.C.G.A. § 15-9-123(a) (2012).
121. O.C.GA § 15-9-120(2).
122. 1986 Ga. Laws 982, 985 (codified at O.C.G.A. § 15-9-120).
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100,000 in 198812 and to 96,000 in 1994."M Each of those amendments was prompted by the fact that the population of one county,
Dougherty County, kept falling below the threshold, thus causing the
potential loss of enhanced jurisdiction by that county's probate court.'2

In the 2010 census, Dougherty County's population dropped below the
96,000 threshold to 94,565. Thus, as of July 1, 2012, Dougherty County
was once again slated to lose its place among those probate courts with
enhanced
jurisdiction. It was the only county that was scheduled to do
6
12

SO.

Effective July 1, 2012, O.C.G.A. § 15-9-120(2) was amended to reduce
the population threshold to 90,000, thus allowing the Dougherty County
Probate Court to maintain its status as a court with expanded jurisdiction. 127 As of July 1, 2012, the following counties have populations
that exceed the 90,000 threshold: Bartow, Bibb, Carroll, Chatham,
Cherokee, Clarke, Clayton, Cobb, Columbia, Coweta, DeKalb, Dougherty,
Douglas, Fayette, Floyd, Forsyth, Fulton, Gwinnett, Hall, Henry,
Houston, Lowndes,
Muskogee, Newton, Paulding, Richmond, and
2
Whitfield.

C.

Workers' Compensation Conservator
O.C.G.A. § 34-9-226129 grants the State Board of Workers' Compensation the limited right to appoint a conservator to handle Workers'
Compensation benefits for a minor or incapacitated adult (referred to in
the statute as a "legally incompetent claimant"). 130 In 2012, this
statute was amended to eliminate the prohibition against such a
conservator serving longer than fifty-two weeks.' 3' This conservator
is allowed not only to administer the minor's or incapacitated adult's
weekly income'32 but also to compromise and terminate workers'
compensation claims of that individual where the net settlement amount

123.
124.
of this
(2012).
125.
126.
127.
128.

129.
130.
131.
to as a
132.

1988 Ga. Laws 743, 744 (codified at O.C.G.A. § 15-9-120).
1994 Ga. Laws 1665,1666 (codified at O.C.G.A. § 15-9-120). The constitutionality
statute was upheld in Ellis v. Johnson, 291 Ga. 127, 132, 728 S.E.2d 200, 204
See Ellis, 291 Ga. at 128, 132, 728 S.E.2d at 201, 203-04.
Id. at 128-29, 132, 728 S.E.2d at 201-02, 204.
Id. at 128-29, 728 S.E.2d at 201-02; see also O.C.GA. § 15-9-120.
See RADFORD, supra note 12, at § 6:1.
O.C.G.A. § 34-9-226 (Supp. 2012).
O.C.G.A. § 34-9-226(a).
O.C.G.A. § 34-9-226 cmt. Prior to the amendment, this conservator was referred
"temporary conservator." Ga. H.R. Bill 971, Reg. Sess. (2012).
O.C.G.A. § 34-9-226(b)(1).

340

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64

is below a certain dollar amount. 133 The amendment raised the dollar
amount of a claim that such a conservator can resolve from $50,000 to
The amended statute now also reflects the Georgia
$100,000.1'
Guardianship Code 131 in providing that no conservator need be appointed if the settlement amount is less than $15,000 and the "natural
parent is the guardian of [the child]."'"

133. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-226(b)(2).
134. O.C.GA. § 34-9-226(bX2) cmt.
135. See O.C.GA. § 29-3-3 (Supp. 2012).
136. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-226(bX2). The Georgia Guardianship Code uses the term"natural
guardian" rather than "natural parent." O.C.GA § 29-3-3(c). A parent of a child is the
natural guardian of his minor child. O.C.GA § 29-1-1(13) (2007). If the parents are
divorced, the parent who has custody is the natural guardian. O.CoG.A. § 29-2-3(b) (2007).
The term "parent" does not include a biological or adoptive parent whose parental rights
have been terminated nor does it include the father of a child who is born out of wedlock.
O.C.G.A. §§ 29-1-1(13) (2007), 19-7-25 (2010).

